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1. Introduction   
 
The vocabulary of ‘imperialism’ has become part of the discourse about economics. Its 
history can be traced back at least to the 1930s, but the generally shared perception of 
economics as an “imperial” science is of a more recent origin. It is a perception of a 
discipline that keeps intruding into the realms of other disciplines such as sociology, 
political science, law, even biology. It is not surprising that the opponents of this trend 
often call it by the name ‘imperialism’, but it is perhaps more surprising that the trend is 
immodestly identified as ‘imperialism’ by the intruders themselves. George Stigler wrote: 
“So economics is an imperial science: it has been aggressive in addressing central 
problems in a considerable number of neighboring social disciplines and without any 
invitations.” (1984: 311). Jack Hirshleifer explains: “What gives economics its 
imperialist invasive power is that our analytic categories … are truly universal in 
applicability.” (1985: 53) In his recent famous QJE article entitled ‘Economic 
imperialism’, Edward Lazear proudly states, “By almost any market test, economics is 
the premier social science. … At least during the last four decades, economics has 
expanded its scope as well as its sphere of influence.” (2000: 99)  
Questions about such a trend are worth asking also in relation to geographical economics 
and economic geography. Some economic geographers have reacted to geographical 
economics alleging that it constitutes a further instance of intellectual imperialism on the 
part of economics. For example, Ron Martin and Peter Sunley assert that there is “an 
economic imperialism colonising the social sciences more generally, and this is certainly 
the case as far as the ‘new economic geography’ is concerned” (Martin and Sunley, 
2001:157), and Trevor Barnes suggests that "Krugman's position might be construed as 
condescending, or even imperialistic" (Barnes, 2003: 89). Others have denied that 
geographical economics has imperialistic inclinations. Historian of economics Stephen 
Meardon (2001:26) observes that “claims that the new economic geography makes new 
forays into uncharted territory - or as more commonly argued […] partly charted but 
subsequently lost territory - are overstated.” Another commentator notes that "Krugman 
lacks imperialistic ambitions" (Isserman 1996: 145).  
 
Some more recent episodes make these issues topical again. First, the Nobel Memorial 
Prize in economics was awarded to Paul Krugman in 2008 for his pioneering contribution 
to what the Nobel Prize committee called “economic geography”. Second, the World 
Development Report 2009 was conspicuously entitled “Reshaping Economic Geography” 
while it is entirely written by economists, mostly inspired by the insights of geographical 
economics.1 Geographers felt offended, claiming that the report “consigns parallel work 
by geographers to the distant background if not to oblivion.” (Scott 2009: 583; see also 
Rigg et al. 2009).  Third, textbooks are being published with “Economic Geography” in 
the title and geographical economics inside (Combes, Mayer, Thisse 2008). 
                                                
1 Geographical economics is widely known as «new economic geography». We will discuss the issue of 
labels in Section 4. 
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‘Imperialism’ is a word that tends to be used with a lot of confusion simply because it is a 
metaphor loaded with all sorts of implicit descriptive, normative, and emotional 
connotations. Among the confusions, it may be thought that, necessarily, intellectual 
imperialism is “aggressive” (as Stigler put it); requires some kind of centralized imperial 
strategy (as one of our referees suggested); applies ideas to domains where they are 
inapplicable; and suppresses the rights and identities of researchers in other disciplines. 
One way of removing such confusions would be to dispense with the word itself.  We 
choose to stick to the word because it is so widely used by practitioners in scientific 
debate, and we meet the challenge of removing confusions by way of unpacking the word 
itself. These clarifications are needed regardless of what one makes of economics 
imperialism, such as denying its existence (“there is no such thing”) or recognizing it as 
real and supportable (“yes, it happens, and it’s a damn good thing too”) or real and bad 
(“it is there, and it should be resisted”). In all such cases statements are made about a 
phenomenon that is typically not well understood.  
 
Hence, we invite readers to bracket whatever prior intuitions they may have concerning 
the expression ‘economics imperialism’ and to follow our analytical suggestions. Our 
perspective is that of contemporary philosophy of science (rather than, say, the 
Realpolitik of international relations). Our goal is to edify, to help improve the quality of 
debate by helping the parties to understand what exactly they are talking about and what 
standards can be used for assessing it. Current attitudes are partly governed by emotions 
such as pride and confidence (on the part of the “imperializers”) and anger or fear (on the 
part of the “imperialized”). We suggest notions of intellectual imperialism that are 
emotionally neutral and that are connected to specific normative standards that can 
themselves be rationally debated. It is then up to the practitioners in economic geography 
and geographical economics to apply those standards in assessing the scientific 
performance of their theories and explanations.   
Intellectual imperialism is a real issue due to a simple fact about scientific inquiry. The 
acquisition and assessment of scientific knowledge always takes place within a complex 
(academic and non-academic) institutional structure of which disciplines and their 
cultures are essential constituents. Epistemic activity does not happen in an institutional 
vacuum. Every now and then, tensions arise between epistemic aspirations and prevailing 
institutional constraints. Debates over intellectual imperialism are among the clearest 
manifestations of such tensions.  
So the questions are: is geographical economics yet another manifestation of economics 
imperialism? And if so, what to make of it? In answering these questions we draw and 
expand on earlier work on the phenomenon of economics imperialism (Mäki 2001, 2002, 
2007, 2009). We distinguish various aspects of the scientific endeavour, epistemic as well 
as institutional, that the general phenomenon of intellectual imperialism can pertain to. 
We also investigate whether the forms of imperialism geographical economics 
instantiates are to be resisted and on what grounds. Our conclusion is: yes and no. Note 
that none of this has to involve a hostile attitude towards geographical economics (or 
economic geography, for that matter). The attitudes that one could adopt include 
celebrating both geographical economics and its imperialistic aspirations; not resisting 
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geographical economics but resisting its presumed imperialism; and resisting one form of 
imperialism while welcoming another form.  
The investigation reported in the present paper is not empirical in the sense that we have 
collected data and established empirical trends. We rather develop conceptual tools and 
outline scenarios and arguments that should be of use by those who wish to make 
statements about the presence, absence, or desirability of intellectual imperialism in 
situations about which they are empirically informed. 
2. Varieties and aspects of economics imperialism    
 
Economics-style models and explanatory principles have been, and increasingly are, used 
to study marital choices, drug addiction, voting behaviour, religion, crime, war, sports, 
sex, brain activity, scientific knowledge, and a host of other phenomena traditionally 
regarded as falling outside the scope of economics. For a few decades now, economics 
has significantly affected disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, law, and political 
science, where it has been met with both outright hostility and enthusiastic support. But 
the debates are often handicapped by treating the phenomenon in an undifferentiated 
way, forgetting that economics imperialism is not a straightforward, uniform and uni-
dimensional trend. The forms it takes, and the aspects of the scientific endeavour it 
shapes, are relevant for its normative evaluation. A nuanced analysis of economics 
imperialism in its various manifestations is needed in order to appraise the soundness of 
arguments for and against it. In particular, epistemic issues need to be analytically 
distinguished from institutional and cultural issues – even though in actual practice they 
are closely entangled.  
Content, target, and agents 
 
Economics imperialism may involve moves such as crossing borders, trespassing, 
transferring, intruding, invading, imposing, and so on. Since no single definition can 
capture all versions and aspects of intellectual imperialism, we will give an idea of some 
such versions by highlighting a few selected aspects or dimensions of imperialistic 
moves. Here we proceed by making three further distinctions (Mäki 2007, 2009).  
 
[1] The first pertains to the content of the imperialistic move, divided into 
imperialism of scope, style and standing. We say more on this in the rest of this 
section. 
[2] The second distinguishes forms of imperialism according to the target of the 
imperialistic move in terms of whether it is targeted onto (merely) a domain of 
phenomena or (also) a discipline. This highlights a difference between the 
relatively innocent domain-only imperialism and the more radical disciplinary 
imperialism.  
[3] The third concerns the agents of imperialism, asking whether they work from 
within the imperializing or the imperialized discipline, that is, whether 
imperialism is internally or externally driven.  
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Scope, Style, and Standing 
 
On the basis of content, we distinguish three forms of economics imperialism:  
 
 [1a] Imperialism of scope. This is a matter of disciplinary expansion in the sense that an 
expansionist discipline, here economics, takes on the challenge of explaining phenomena 
that used to belong to the perceived domain of another discipline, here economic 
geography. Imperialism of scope amounts to striving for explanatory unification 
irrespective of disciplinary boundaries.  
[1b] Imperialism of style. This is a matter of the style and strategy of research, namely, 
the techniques and standards of inquiry and communication, such as whether to prefer 
verbal narrative or mathematical proof, statistical test or rich case study. Conceptions and 
practices related to such things are somehow transferred to or imposed on other 
disciplines.  
[1c] Imperialism of standing. This is a matter of academic status and political standing as 
well as acknowledged societal relevance: the growth in the standing of one discipline 
occurs at the expense of that of another.    
These three forms of imperialism are likely to trigger various responses amongst the 
practitioners of the target disciplines. It seems obvious that the last two tend to trigger the 
strongest emotional responses. Imperialisms of style and standing challenge the deeper 
values, social status, traditions, conventions, resources, and life styles of researchers 
whose domains or disciplines are entered by the imperialists. In many cases, imperialism 
of scope goes together with imperialism of style and/or standing. If the imperial scope-
expanding theory embodies a particular style of theorising, very different from the one 
dominant in the target discipline, and enjoys a certain standing, higher than the one 
enjoyed by the target discipline, it might be difficult to disentangle imperialism of scope 
from that of standing and style. But the link is not unavoidable. If both proponents and 
critics deem the imperialistic theory just as one among a number of alternative legitimate 
theories about a domain of phenomena, then it might be that its disciplinary origins are 
regarded as irrelevant.  
In assessing economics imperialism, we prefer keeping the three forms distinct. This is 
not the line adopted by Lazear. Superiority in style and standing are his criteria. He says 
that the «power of economics lies in its rigor. Economics is scientific; it follows the 
scientific method … Economics succeeds where other social sciences fail because 
economists are willing to abstract.» (2000, 102) Lazear's proposal is to measure the 
success of economics imperialism in terms of the influence it has on scholars outside of 
economics; on his rather ruthless metric, «forcing noneconomists out of business» is a 
sign of success (2000, 103). Our view contrasts with that of Lazear in that his criterion is 
sociological while ours is epistemological and ontological: the success of economics 
imperialism should be measured for how well the expanding theory captures whatever 
degree of unity there is among the phenomena it seeks to unify, irrespective of the 
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number of scholars who endorse it, or more dramatically, of the disciplinary affiliation of 
those who are forced out of business.  
Our position is that for economics imperialism to be fairly appraised, it is crucial to keep 
issues of scope (domain-only imperialism) separate from those of standing and style 
(disciplinary imperialism). Whereas imperialism of scope, if properly constrained, is 
potentially progressive, imperialism of style and imperialism of standing are less 
obviously so. Positions of academic dominance or fashionable research styles may have 
little or nothing to do with genuine scientific merits. In some conceivable situations, 
imperialism of style and standing may hinder scientific progress rather than facilitating it. 
The higher standing of a theory vis-à-vis another is not a straightforward and reliable 
indicator of this theory’s superiority in solving the explanatory, predictive and practical 
demands that we value highly. On the other hand, it often happens that a technique 
proves to do well in disciplines other than the one where the technique was originally 
developed, so its transfer should be welcome.    
3. Explanatory unification and imperialism of scope  
 
It has been proposed that imperialism of scope is a special case of the general 
methodological norm of explanatory unification (Mäki 2001, 2002, 2007, 2009). It is 
common in a variety of disciplines that scientists have the goal of increasing a theory’s 
degree of explanatory unification by way of applying it to ever new types of phenomena. 
That is, one and the same theory – often mediated by its models – is used for explaining 
an increasing number of apparently different kinds of phenomena. Depending on the 
“disciplinary location” of the unified phenomena, what we get is either intra-disciplinary 
or inter-disciplinary explanatory unification. It is largely a matter of social and historical 
contingency whether the new classes of phenomena are studied by disciplines other than 
the one in which the theory was originally proposed. Hence it is largely a contingent 
matter whether the pursuit of explanatory unification translates into imperialism of scope 
(or inter-disciplinary unification).  
 
So understood, imperialism of scope can be justified on the basis of a respectable 
philosophy of science that conceives explanatory unification as an important theoretical 
virtue. Philosophers of science have ascribed further virtues to unifying theories: 
Whewell (1847) regarded a unifying theory (or consilient theory, to use his phrase) to be 
more likely to be true, while Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981) take the explanatory 
power of a theory to be a function of its unifying power. Explanatory unification has to 
do with the idea of “explaining much by little,” which can be variously cashed out as for 
example “minimizing the number of derivational patterns while maximizing the number 
of conclusions” or “reducing the number of apparently separate and diverse phenomena 
by showing them to be manifestations of the same set of objects or causes”.  
Although imperialism of scope can be understood and justified in light of the 
methodological ideal of explanatory unification, this does not imply that the pursuit of 
unification and its manifestation in economics imperialism are to be unconditionally 
accepted. Three kinds of constraint have been proposed: ontological, epistemological and 
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pragmatic (Mäki 2001, 2009). It is only when these constraints are met that imperialism 
of scope is to be celebrated as a scientific achievement. We first show that the 
development of geographical economics is motivated by the pursuit of explanatory 
unification. Next, we reflect on whether geographical economics imperialism of scope 
meets the ontological, pragmatic and epistemological constraints. This gives us a 
descriptive and (partial) normative assessment of this aspect of the endeavour of 
geographical economics.    
The structure of unification in geographical economics 
 
The uneven distribution of economic activity shows a fractal dimension, that is, it repeats 
itself at different levels of spatial aggregation. To geographical economists this suggests 
that apparently distinct types of spatial phenomena might be (at least partly) brought 
about by the same kind of economic mechanisms, namely "economic mechanisms 
yielding agglomeration by relying on the trade-off between various forms of increasing 
returns and different types of mobility costs" (Fujita and Thisse, 2000: 1). Instead of 
investigating each of those types of phenomena separately, using a different theory for 
each, geographical economics proposes a unified approach.  
 
Unification is regarded as a major virtue of geographical economics, a virtue that it 
shares with theories in more mature fields: “there is a need to unify fields in 
economics just like in physics, and the book [Fujita et al. 1999] has contributed to 
this discourse” (Urban, 2001: 151). This is also where the alleged novelty of 
geographical economic lies. Past spatial inquiry was characterized by a diversity of 
theories and fields.  
The empirical phenomena […] have been studied thoroughly from many different 
angles, based on different theoretical frameworks, for a long time. From what is 
primarily a location perspective there are urban economics, economic geography, 
regional economics, and regional science. The interaction between economic 
centers is addressed by international economics, development economics, and 
industrial organization. One way to proceed would be to investigate each 
empirical phenomenon separately, using the insights of those of the above fields, 
inside or outside economics, which are thought to be relevant for the issue at 
hand. (Brakman et al., 2001: 17-18)  
So the choice is between a separatist approach, designing and applying distinct theories 
for dealing with what appear to be distinct types of phenomena, and a unifying approach, 
applying and adjusting one grand theory to account for those various classes of 
phenomena and thereby showing that they are not distinct after all. Geographical 
economics goes for the latter, proposing a unified and unifying approach deriving 
agglomeration from the location decisions of optimizing agents within a general 
equilibrium framework (Brakman and Garretsen, 2003).  
As geographical economists themselves recognise (cf. the previous quote), economic 
geography is one of the disciplines that has traditionally been interested in the spatial 
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distribution of economic activity and in agglomeration phenomena of the kinds 
geographical economics attempts to unify. Economic geography shares an “interest in the 
spatial distribution of economic activity, in why regions grow at different rates, and in the 
fundamental principles underlying cities and the structure of urban systems” (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2001: 178). Therefore, in its pursuit of explanatory unification, geographical 
economics has entered the domain of economic geography and thereby turned into 
imperialism of scope.  
Constraints on imperialism of scope 
 
In order to be favourably assessed, imperialism of scope should be constrained – not just 
any scope expansion across disciplinary boundaries will do. There are ontological, 
epistemological and pragmatic constraints that should be met. First, it is not enough just 
to derive an expanding range of explanandum sentences from a theory as an exercise of 
logic or mathematics. One also must show that the apparently diverse explanandum 
phenomena are united in the real world: that they are of the same kind after all, in the 
sense that they are constituted by the same components or that they manifest the 
functioning of the same mechanisms. This is the ontological constraint.   
 
The degree of unification suggested by a theory should correspond to the degree of real 
unity among the phenomena it unifies. Unification by theory should be taken as far as 
there is unity in the world. Hence, unification should not be a matter of imposition, but of 
discovery. There is a difference between two kinds of accomplishments: first, applying a 
highly abstract set of theoretical tools to deal with phenomena in different domains by 
way of deriving stylised descriptions of those phenomena from the theory; and second, 
discovering that a set of phenomena are composed or caused similarly, for example are 
the result of the same real-world mechanism, and hence can be accounted for by the same 
substantive theory. The ontological constraint requires that the accomplishment should be 
of the latter kind. Success in mere derivational exercises within formal models will not 
suffice.  
 
Now it is clear that the practice of geographical economics relies on formal derivations, 
but this alone does not rule out the possibility of meeting the ontological constraint. As 
argued more extensively elsewhere (Mäki and Marchionni 2009), even though 
mathematics has played a prominent role in the unification effected by geographical 
economics, its pursuit of unification appears to have been motivated by ontological 
considerations, that is, by the conviction that agglomeration phenomena at different 
levels of aggregation are brought about by the same kind of real-world economic 
mechanisms. If this is correct, it implies a recommendation for imperialism of scope. 
Here is some representative textual evidence: 
[…] geographical economics is able to show that the same mechanisms are 
at work at different levels of spatial aggregation. The idea that at least to 
some extent the same underlying economic forces are relevant for 
explaining the spatial organization of cities, the interaction between 
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regions within a nation, as well as the uneven distribution of GDP across 
countries is very important. (Brakman et al., 2001: 323; italics added)  
Although pre-theoretic reasons for believing in unity in the world might or might not 
drive a given theoretical endeavour, it is empirical evidence that should ultimately 
convince us of whether the theory correctly captures whatever unity there is between 
phenomena. This leads us to the epistemological constraint on economics imperialism of 
scope. Empirical tests are never conclusive, they always involve ineliminable uncertainty. 
Well-known difficulties of theory testing in both the natural and the social sciences 
recommend caution when accepting a theory and rejecting its actual and potential 
alternatives. Whatever the degree of unity among real-world phenomena, our unifying 
theory might not get that unity exactly right, and we have no error-free way of checking 
whether it does. The radical epistemic uncertainty that beset the social sciences also 
applies to geographical economics, especially given that its empirical performance is still 
partly an open issue. As geographical economists themselves admit, empirical evidence is 
still scarce and often inconclusive, and in many cases it still fails to discriminate between 
alternative explanations (Combes et al. 2008; Brakman et al. 2001 and 2009; Redding 
2010). 
Furthermore, the partial nature of scientific theories makes it unlikely that highly 
unifying theories will be able to meet all the relevant explanatory, predictive and practical 
demands we may have about a set of phenomena. Geographical economics focuses on a 
limited set of explanatory factors, viz. economic mechanisms that rely on the trade-off 
between increasing returns and mobility costs, and this limits the range of questions it is 
able to address. For example, it can address questions such as why economic activity is 
agglomerated rather than fully dispersed at different scales of spatial aggregation, but not 
why agglomeration occurs in some places but not in others (Marchionni 2006). Epistemic 
uncertainty and the partiality of theories provide reasons for rejecting monistic and 
dogmatic attitudes, and recommend more permissive and pluralistic standpoints with 
fallibilist modesty. An acceptable economics imperialism should be epistemologically 
soft and must avoid complacent and arrogant intolerance.  
The pragmatic or axiological constraint pertains to the significance of the phenomena a 
theory unifies and of the questions asked and answered about them. There is little reason 
to celebrate a theory that unifies phenomena regarded as relatively insignificant, 
irrelevant or uninteresting, while it ignores or marginalizes others that are perceived as 
highly significant. What counts as significant is a pragmatic and value-laden matter that 
varies with time, community, and context. Ideas about significance lie beneath many of 
the economic geographers’ charges against geographical economics, revealing the 
epistemic or other human values that they deem important. Geographers have identified a 
wealth of issues that the geographical economics models omit and that geographers 
believe to be important (See for example Dymski 1996, Martin 2008, Olsen 2000, Scott 
2004, Sheppard 2001, Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002, Rigg et al. 2009.)  
Judgements of significance can be about the explanatory reach of a theory. On one 
judgement, Krugman’s model and its follow-ups “may well be a description of life on 
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some planet somewhere in the universe, but what exactly is its relevance to an 
understanding of economic realities on planet earth at any time in the past or the 
foreseeable future?” (Scott 2004: 486). Others argue that because of its omissions, the 
insights offered by geographical economics are “unable to tell us where it [industrial 
localisation and specialisation] actually occurs, or why in particular places and not in 
others” (Martin 1999b: 78). Judgements of significance may also concern policy 
implications. The World Development Report 2009 has been argued to manifest 
“paradigmatic blind spots” of geographical economics in that its policy recommendations 
ignore or suppress highly important issues of power and politics, gender and ethnicity, 
justice and environment (Rigg et al. 2009). Martin (2008) argues that the geographical 
economics models are too partial and unrealistic to be suited as a basis for regional 
policy.  
Without taking a stance on any particular claim about significance, it is important to note 
that there is no way these issues can be bypassed. The diversity of epistemic and other 
values that implicitly or explicitly guide theorizing must be recognized and openly 
addressed. 
4. Domain-only to disciplinary imperialism?   
 
We have characterised economics imperialism of scope as an attempt to explain 
phenomena that ‘belong’ to the domain of a discipline other than economics. This 
characterization is silent about whether imperialism is targeted merely onto a domain of 
phenomena or also a discipline. An academic discipline is one thing, and a domain of 
phenomena is another—even though a discipline is often defined as an investigation of a 
domain. It is one thing to enter a domain of phenomena in an attempt to explain those 
phenomena. It is quite another thing to enter a discipline in the attempt to change its 
orientation, theoretical convictions, and styles of inquiry.  
What is involved in domain-only imperialism is just the relatively unproblematic 
imperialism of scope that we have discussed. When an expansive discipline enters a new 
domain of phenomena seeking to explain them, this alone might not be perceived as 
inappropriate by the practitioners whose discipline is defined in terms of that domain. 
This is even more so if the expansionistic theory only seeks to explain a subset of 
phenomena comprising the domain in question. On the other hand, disciplinary 
imperialism goes further in that it involves attempted reshaping or, in the extreme case, 
replacing the target discipline. Imperialism of style and of standing (with or without an 
accompanying imperialism of scope) are versions of such disciplinary imperialism.  
There are three questions related to this distinction that deserve our attention. The first is 
whether the domain of phenomena that geographical economics entered ‘belongs’ to 
economic geography and not to geographical economics. The second is whether 
geographical economics imperialism has concerned only the domain or also the 





The term ‘economics imperialism’ has typically been used to refer to cases where the 
newly entered territories were perceived as falling outside the traditional domain of 
economics (crime, marriage, religion, science, bureaucracy). One of the most problematic 
aspects of this form of economics imperialism is taken to be that “as scientific 
methodologies move further away from their central areas of application, their 
abstractions become even grosser, and their relevance to the phenomena ever more 
distant” (Dupré 1994: 380). Geographical economics imperialism however appears to be 
immune to this kind of criticism because it is concerned with domains perceived to 
naturally fall within the purview of economics.  
The German locational school of von Thünen, Weber and Lösch dealt with issues of 
space, relied on mathematical modelling - though of a different sort than in present day 
geographical economics - and to some extent represents a common ancestor of both 
geographical economics and economic geography. Indeed, some believe that 
geographical economics is just a repackaging or at any rate a continuation of those 
economic ideas and style of analysis, which geographers have rejected long ago (Barnes  
2003). In addition, although the general mainstream of the economics discipline ignored 
spatial questions, sub-disciplines such as urban and regional economics didn’t (Meardon 
2001). This gives support to those who claim that because spatial issues belong to the 
perceived domain of economics, geographical economics is not a case of economics 
imperialism.  
Allen Scott rightly points out the futility of possessive claims to spatial phenomena on the 
part of economic geographers.  
The geographer’s stock-in-trade, nowadays, is usually claimed to revolve in 
various ways around questions of space and spatial relations. This claim provides 
a reassuring professional anchor of sorts, but is in practice open to appropriation 
by virtually any social science, given that space is intrinsically constitutive of all 
social science. In fact, geographers and other social scientists regularly encounter 
one another at points that lie deep inside each other’s proclaimed fields of inquiry 
(...) (Scott, 2004: 481)  
Perceived disciplinary boundaries are blurred and unstable, they are never explicitly and 
sharply defined nor fixed once and for all, and they are largely the result of social and 
historical contingencies. Rather than space having been viewed as somehow distinctively 
non-economic and therefore permanently excluded from the domain of economics, there 
was a period when spatial issues were just neglected by the mainstream of the economics 
discipline as a subject of active research. This historical and academic contingency 
created room for others, namely economic geographers, to appropriate the vacant 
territory. Now some economic geographers may feel that the renewed interest by 
economists in that territory constitutes a case of imperialistic intrusion.  
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It is illuminating to contrast this case with the more familiar cases of economics 
imperialism. Crime, marriage, religion, law, sex, suicide, voting and bureaucracy used to 
be identified as non-economic phenomena that belonged to the domains of non-
economics disciplines such as sociology, political science and legal theory. Since the 
1950s, economics has entered all those disciplines and their previous domains. This 
seems a far more radical change than the renewed interest in space by economics.  
Although feelings of possession towards their own domain might partly explain the 
defensive accusations by economic geographers, it would be unfair to reduce them to 
those feelings alone. There are likely to be other sources of worry.    
Fears of disciplinary imperialism 
 
What may have motivated the economic geographers’ accusations is the fear that domain-
only imperialism might turn into disciplinary imperialism. Commentaries are divided on 
this issue. Some imply that geographical economics is a case of domain-only 
imperialism. For instance, “Krugman has not so much entered into the discourse of 
geographers as appropriated some geographic questions.” (Dymski, 1996:  448-9). 
Another commentator explicitly takes up the imperialism issue and notes that  
[…] Krugman, unlike Isard, shows no signs of wanting to start a new discipline or 
even to establish colonies within geography departments. He just likes the term 
economic geography [..] but Krugman's word choice is probably as poor as Isard's 
was. Krugman's work is economics, not geography. The cumbersome 
"geographical economics" […], if not the familiar regional economics or location 
theory, or even the JEL classification spatial economics, would have made clear 
that Krugman lacks imperialistic ambitions" (Isserman, 1996: 45).  
On the other hand, some economic geographers have expressed the fear that geographical 
economics could end up imperializing their discipline. Here is an informative passage: 
Today, the field [economic geography] is subject to particularly strong 
contestation from two main sources. One of these lies largely outside geography 
proper and is being energetically pushed by economists under the rubric of a new 
geographical economics. It represents a major professional challenge to economic 
geographers by reason of its threatened appropriation and theoretical 
transformation of significant parts of the field (Scott, 2004: 483; emphasis added)  
This probably captures the empirical and emotional springboard of the anti-imperialist 
resistance. It is plausible that what has mostly motivated the suspicious reactions of 
economic geographers has been the fear that the re-emerged interest of economists in 
spatial questions might transform into disciplinary imperialism that reshapes or replaces 
the discipline of economic geography. A criticism of the World Development Report 
2009 blames it for ignoring the contributions of economic geographers, ending with an 
emotionally laden question, «how would economists feel if a group of geographers 
sought to reshape economics and blithely ignored their scholarship?» (Rigg et al. 2009, 
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135) These qualms may turn into an existential anxiety that supports a defensive attitude, 
that of protecting one disciplinary culture against being replaced or deeply affected by 
another. As one geographer emphatically puts it, “Defending our version of economic 
geography is also defending our identity and our ‘cultural existence’ as a discipline and 
as individuals.” (Schoenberger 2001: 379).  
 
‘New economic geography’ or ‘geographical economics’? 
 
Labels are not arbitrary, they convey messages, and those messages are not always in full 
control by those who use the labels. The two labels at stake here can be aligned with our 
distinctions, but obviously they have not been consistently used with the following 
connotations.  
‘Geographical economics’ appears to denote an activity taking place within the discipline 
of economics – an activity dealing with geographical issues. This is in line with the idea 
of domain-only imperialism: economics expands its domain by seeking to explain spatial 
phenomena, including those that were previously dealt with by economic geography, but 
the latter’s values and practices are not put in question. On the other hand, ‘new economic 
geography’ appears to name an activity that takes place within the discipline of economic 
geography, or with important consequences for this discipline. This suggests disciplinary 
imperialism that seeks to transform the target discipline. ‘New economic geography’ 
implies the idea of ‘old economic geography’ and these labels are not value-free given 
the current culturally sustained attitudes concerning age. What is old is appropriately 
replaced by what is new. Furthermore, once the replacement has successfully taken place, 
the attributes can be dropped: ‘new economic geography’ may become just ‘economic 
geography’. This seems to be exemplified by the title of a recent textbook in geographical 
economics entitled Economic Geography (Combes et al. 2008).2 
A further complication is due to a domain-discipline ambiguity. What starts out being 
used as a name of a domain may transform into a name for a discipline or research field.  
This seems to have happened to 'economic geography'. Krugman's «Increasing returns 
and economic geography» (1991) used 'economic geography' to name a domain of 
phenomena, namely economic phenomena with a difference-making spatial aspect, and 
not the discipline of economic geography. By the time the Nobel Prize Committee made 
its statement about Krugman's contributions to 'economic geography', the phrase had 
undergone a semantic shift, now naming a research field or discipline. The latter usage 
has thereafter spread. The label of 'new economic geography' is different. In contrast to 
the early uses of 'economic geography' as a name of a domain, 'new economic geography' 
is unambiguously a name for a discipline or research field. 
5. Disciplinary imperialism and institutions of inquiry  
 
The most innocuous form of imperialism is imperialism of scope in its domain-only 
variety. This could be accompanied by healthy scientific competition and/or collaboration 
                                                
2 As one of the referees pointed out to us, however, the book was first published in French under the title 
«Economie géographique».  
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that inspire all contestant or contributing disciplines to improve their explanatory 
performance with respect to partly shared domains of phenomena. The innocence will 
vanish once this turns into disciplinary imperialism that endangers the characteristic 
practices or identity-constituting ways of life in the target discipline so as to replace or 
reshape them with those of the imperializing discipline.  
How to assess disciplinary imperialism 
The move from domain-only imperialism to disciplinary imperialism gives rise to a 
whole new set of issues that cannot be settled in the ways suggested in section 3. It is a 
shift from epistemic issues to institutional and cultural issues. The principles guiding our 
attitudes and strategies regarding disciplinary imperialism are different but they should 
meet the demanding challenge of connecting the institutional/cultural issues to the 
epistemic ones. They should help us to identify and design institutional arrangements that 
maximally promote the acquisition of relevantly true information about the world, as well 
as to identify and remove arrangements that inhibit such a pursuit. This is the agenda of 
so-called social epistemology. 
Social epistemology deals with the institutional structure of scientific inquiry. It is based 
on the obvious idea that inquiry does not take place in an institutional vacuum and that 
the institutions of inquiry make a difference for its performance. In characterizing 
optimal scientific institutions, social epistemologists typically emphasize the importance 
of sufficient variety of viewpoints as well as sufficiently open and critical conversational 
culture. Too much homogeneity and closed dogmatism would be epistemically risky; 
they would make the recognition of even major errors difficult and would discourage the 
creation and pursuit of alternative and possibly fruitful lines of inquiry. On the other 
hand, too much heterogeneity and criticism would also be inadvisable. (For extended 
arguments, see e.g. Goldman 1999, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2001.)       
We can now envision different simplified scenarios of disciplinary imperialism. At the 
optimistic end, we have the improved articulation scenario that portrays disciplinary 
imperialism as triggering critical reflection and explicit articulation of the foundations of 
theories and standards on all sides, thereby making claims better justified. This would 
take place through arguments, persuasion, conversation, debate and criticism. In some 
cases this can contribute to improving the standards of inquiry in both the target and the 
imperializing discipline, or in one of them.3 At the pessimistic extreme, the crowding-out 
scenario depicts disciplinary imperialism with a monopolistic bent taking place by way 
of conquest, imposition, dismissal, and administrative measures. A wholesale conversion 
like this can have unpleasant consequences for scientific progress by suppressing 
alternative styles of inquiry. In between the two extremes, there is the re-ranking 
scenario on which the theories and methods previously held in the target discipline 
become ranked lower than the newly introduced ideas transferred from the imperializing 
discipline. In practice, re-ranking may result in crowding out, and in principle, re-ranking 
is compatible with improved articulation. The kinds of consideration that motivate social 
                                                
3 Some commentators (e.g. Miller 1997) take the conflict economics imperialism generated within political 
science to have prompted political scientists to critically reconsider their own standards. 
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epistemology support the improved articulation scenario and make us wary of the 




The imperialistic successes of a discipline may be based on its academic and political 
standing. A powerful discipline tends to be listened to by policy makers and supported by 
university administrators, admired (perhaps with envy or irritation) by neighbouring 
disciplines, and funded generously by research funding agencies. The chances grow that 
if such a high-status discipline starts explaining phenomena that used to belong to the 
domain of a lower-status discipline, this may gradually have consequences for the 
customary practices and even survival of the lower-status discipline. 
Economic geographers have reflected upon the issue of the standing of economics vis-à-
vis economic geography (see Martin 1999b; Henry et al. 2001; Amin and Thrift 2000). 
Henry et al. observe the powerful position that economics occupies in the social sciences, 
also visible “in the media and in numerous branches of government and other institutions 
responsible for policy work” (2001: 203). They go on to point out how “the hegemony of 
economics has been reinforced by the way that formal academic audit research has 
valorised work in certain journals”; and finally, they notice that “the hegemony and 
confidence of neoclassical theory seemingly rubs off on those graduates who go off to 
work in Whitehall, the Bank of England, the city of London, and finance" so that “there is 
a clear bond between the role enjoyed by economics as an academic discipline and the 
characteristics of policy audiences seeking economic knowledges” (Ibid. 203-204).4 
Some economic geographers express dissatisfaction with what they perceive as their 
relatively inferior position vis-à-vis economics (e.g. Amin and Thrift 2000).  
Widespread seems the image of two disciplines engaged in an “uneven battle out of 
which economists, given their sheer size and public influence, are likely to emerge 
victorious” (Duranton and Rodríguez-Pose, 2005: 1695). As mentioned above, these 
concerns seem to be justified by the recent World Development Report 2009 which has 
been considerably influenced by geographical economics theories, while largely ignoring 
economic geographers’ work. A few commentaries have complained that the focus on the 
narrow set of explanatory factors considered by economic theory has produced a rather 
simplistic picture of the influence of geography on development, something that could 
have been avoided had geographers’ work been taken into account (Bryceson et al. 2009; 
Rigg et al. 2009). All this testifies that a significant component of the worries of 
economic geographers has to do with the standing of economics and of geographical 
economics vis-à-vis their own discipline.  
We propose that when imperialism of scope and standing occur together, a particularly 
cautious attitude should be adopted. The danger is that the powerful position of a 
discipline or approach gives it an extra edge in the scientific competition independently 
                                                
4 Similarly, “The ideological power of economics is such that it may not actually matter whether or not 
there is an academic economist whispering in the minister’s ear; the minister can hear the whispers 
anyway” (Peck 2000: 256).  
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of its epistemic performance. If geographical economics has greater policy influence than 
economic geography just in virtue of the higher standing of economics, and not in virtue 
of any spectacular empirical support or explanatory performance it has gained in the 
domain of spatial phenomena, then we might be facing a suspicious form of economics 
imperialism. (A similar danger can emerge also when a hegemonic theory develops 
within one discipline, irrespective of its empirical credentials.) There is no need to 
discourage attempts at unification within the sciences in order to protect us against these 
dangers; the kind of pluralistic environment discussed above constitutes the best hedge 
against the hegemony of inadequate theories.    
Style 
 
Another mechanism whereby domain-only imperialism can turn into disciplinary 
imperialism is through imperialism of style. If a given style of doing research is deemed 
scientifically superior, what was initially an application of a theory to a new domain of 
phenomena can turn into a widespread commitment to this allegedly superior style, also 
within the target discipline. Crowding-out or re-ranking scenarios would materialize. 
Suspicions of imperialism of style constitute another considerable source for the 
economic geographers’ accusations of improper imperialism. Indeed, geographical 
economists have at times expressed dismissive attitudes towards styles of inquiry that do 
not conform to the standards of economics. Krugman remarks that “to be taken seriously 
an idea has to be something you can model” (Krugman 1995: 5).5 In geographical 
economics publications, one can find statements such as “the standard model of economic 
geography relies on the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition” (Combes et al. 
2008: 54; italics added). In one of the few explicit defences of geographical economics 
against the charges of geographers, Henry Overman (2004: 503) argues that the approach 
of geographical economics avoids “vague theory and thin empirics”, problems that beset 
economic geography. First, mathematical models serve to identify which assumptions are 
crucial for obtaining which results, and models in geographical economics allow the 
derivation of macro behaviour from micro behaviour in an internally consistent way. 
Second, empirical work in geographical economics is often more rigorous than in 
economic geography: the former places more emphasis on the identification and testing 
of refutable predictions and on issues of observational equivalence.6 Such statements, 
whether intended or not, can contribute to creating the impression that economists regard 
their style of inquiry as somehow superior, or more dramatically, as the only serious 
scientific game in town, thereby justifying either crowding out or re-ranking.  
A number of economic geographers have commented on the methodological divide 
between the two disciplines (Martin 1999b; Amin and Thrift 2000; Clark 1998; Dymski 
1992). The style of economic geography is portrayed as one in which “explanations are 
built ‘from below,’ often relying upon close dialogue with individual agents and 
                                                
5 Krugman then concedes that important insights might be developed even without the aid of formal 
models, but that “strangely, though, I can’t think of any” (1995: 88). 
6 Overman (2004) also points out that geographical economics has its own weaknesses and that there are 
areas where interaction with geographers would be beneficial. 
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organisations, and linking this ‘local’ knowledge with wider, larger stylized facts and 
conceptual frameworks” (Martin 1999b: 81). By contrast, geographical economics is 
characterised by “deductivist, mathematical demonstration” in which the focus of interest 
is shaped by “mathematical tractability rather than the apparent diversity of economic 
systems” and “the complexity of the economic landscape is one of mathematical 
solvability, rather than empirical messiness and particularity” (ibid. 81; Clark 1998). 
Sometimes philosophical labels are applied, such as when claiming that geographical 
economists employ «positivistic accounts», whereas economic geographers have 
abandoned them in favour of «realist approaches» (Martin 1999b).  
As we have argued elsewhere, many such characterizations are based on 
misunderstandings and inaccurate images that tend to exaggerate the differences. The 
divide between the two disciplines cannot be captured in terms of positivism versus 
realism, and their explanatory questions are characteristically complementary rather than 
rival (Mäki and Oinas 2004; Marchionni 2004).7 Nevertheless, what emerges from this 
aspect of the dispute is that the worries expressed by economic geographers have a lot to 
do with imperialism of style, namely the fear that the general equilibrium rational choice 
models of geographical economics, and the associated formal and econometric 
techniques, could invade their discipline at the expense of their own preferred styles of 
theoretical and empirical inquiry.  
Some economic geographers however have conceded the possibility that there might be 
something to learn from geographical economics. For instance,  
“Even if one rejects the logic behind the approach underpinning most economics, there 
are a few ingredients that economic geographers would do well to retain. These 
include stringency and precision in conceptualization. Not least empirically, major 
gains are to be had from conceptual clarity and theoretical propositions that are 
amenable to verification […] Similarly, formal logic has some desirable properties, 
such as clarity of expression and being able to identify counterintuitive results” 
(Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002: 477; see also Martin 1999a: 389) 
In a similar spirit, Duranton and Rodríguez-Pose (2005: 1703) note that “[e]ach approach 
has its advantages and disadvantages” and hence that “[f]inding a middle ground between 
the two approaches could help maximize the advantages of both of them and minimise 
some of the problems that become exacerbated at the extremes”. In line with the 
improved articulation scenario, this is one route whereby economics imperialism, even 
when it involves issues of style, can potentially generate scientific progress. 8  
                                                
7 Besides, economic geographers also adopt formal models, though these typically differ from the general 
equilibrium models grounded in rational choice theory of geographical economics (see for example 
Plummer 2003, Sheppard 2001).  
8 In case this were taken to presuppose that there is one best scientific method and that we know what it is, 
it is worth reminding that this idea has been long ago found unsound by most philosophers of science and 
others in the science studies community. Recognising the legitimacy of a variety of scientific standards and 
styles of research however does not imply giving up standards of good scientific practice altogether. 
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6. Agents and institutions of inter-disciplinary relations  
 
Our third distinction concerns the disciplinary location of the agents or the sources of the 
imperialistic moves: those located within a discipline and those located outside its 
boundaries. This gives us a distinction between internally driven imperialism and 
externally driven imperialism. We have a discipline, economic geography, with some 
idea of the set of phenomena constituting its domain. We also have geographical 
economics style of reasoning, originating in another discipline, that of economics. The 
question is whether the geographical economics style of reasoning with respect to that 
domain is introduced and practiced by economic geographers or by economists. The 
difference between internally driven and externally driven imperialism often makes a 
difference for the overall dynamics of the disciplines involved. What began as externally 
driven imperialism might be reinforced by internally driven forms of imperialism, so that 
a mild form of domain-only imperialism might slowly turn into a stronger disciplinary 
intrusion leaving decreasing room for alternative approaches in the target discipline. 
Internally driven imperialism might at first seem less problematic in being voluntary and 
not based on external imposition. Yet, it might simply be more subtle, especially if it 
involves extreme forms of imperialism of standing and/or style. 
The divide between externally-driven and internally-driven imperialism is also 
empirically unstable. Geographical economics is mostly an instance of externally driven 
imperialism, that is, driven by economists. This sets it apart from the familiar instances of 
economics imperialism as presently practiced such as those in political science, law, and 
sociology where practitioners in the target disciplines are actively involved in the 
expansion of the scope of economics. In some of those cases, what begins as externally 
driven imperialism can become, or can be reinforced by, internally driven imperialism as 
it occurred in political science and law. For the time being, however, we have no reason 
to believe that this pattern will be implemented in the case of economic geography.9  
The range of possible attitudes and activities within the target discipline includes not just 
active importation of ideas from the imperial discipline, but also those of more passive 
welcoming and other sorts of supporting of the imperializing moves. However, economic 
geographers have mostly considered strategies to combat the perceived imperialist 
ambitions of geographical economics. Three responses have been proposed: to retreat, 
and so to abandon that portion of the domain that economists now address, giving it over 
to them; to communicate with the imperialists; and to ignore the imperialist theories and 
aspirations. 
The response of retreat has been recommended by Amin and Thrift (2000: 8) who 
warned economic geographers that they “would be fooling [themselves] if [they] believe 
                                                
9 In 1996, Dymski noticed that “geographers inclined to agree with Krugman already use such models (if 
not his models); and those who inclined to disagree with him are unlikely to accept his characterisation of 
theorizing as an extended conversation with mainstream economics.” (1996: 448-9) If Dymski's 
observation is right still today, then internally-driven imperialism is likely to remain a peripheral 
phenomenon in economic geography and will co-exist with a variety of approaches to spatial issues. 
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that [they] can lie down with the lion and become anything more than prey”. They urge 
economic geographers to leave aside “economic issues” as a strategy to resist 
economists’ imperialism. Many geographers have expressed the worry that Amin and 
Thrift’s proposed strategy could have the opposite outcome, that is, to strengthen 
economics imperialism, or in our words, to contribute to the implementation of the 
crowding out scenario. “If we vacate areas of economic geography on the grounds that 
they are too ‘economic’, we could find more and more of the subject being colonised by 
these new geographical economists.” (Martin and Sunley 2001: 158) The worry is shared 
by others: “As long as geographers turn their backs on economics the traditional turf of 
economic geography will be colonised, not because economists are inherently imperialist 
... but because geographers shy away from dialogue” (Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002: 476). 
Accordingly, some economic geographers have thought that the best response is to 
communicate: to keep hold of the domain, while communicating with the economists, and 
thereby improve both their own and the imperialists’ theory (see Duranton and 
Rodríguez-Pose 2005; Dymski 1996; Martin and Sunley 1996; Sjöberg and Sjöholm 
2002). Others however doubt that there is any common ground between the two 
approaches; rather than communicating with them, geographers had better adopt the third 
strategy and ignore the economists’ imperialistic theories (see Martin 2003).  
Which of such responses will be selected makes a difference for the dynamics of 
scientific progress. The consequences of scientific imperialism for the disciplines 
involved depend both on the actions and attitudes by those in the imperialising discipline 
and on the actions and attitudes of the imperialised. Economic geographers’ responses to 
economics imperialism play a role in bolstering or hampering its progressive potentials or 
detrimental effects. 
Of the three kinds of response we recommend communication. But, as we have seen 
above, useful interdisciplinary communication presupposes rather ideal attitudes and 
institutions that support, at the same time, criticism and tolerance, pluralism and 
stringency, self-reflection and open-mindedness. In such circumstances, no theory or 
method or argument would be accepted or rejected just because of its disciplinary origins 
or affiliations. Arrogant imperialism ignorant about the target discipline as well as 
defensive anti-imperialism ignorant of the imperial discipline would be banned. Mutually 
fruitful interaction “will depend on one group overcoming its indifference and the other 
overcoming its thinly disguised hostility” (Overman 2004: 513). Ideal communication 
within and between disciplines is a way to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
theories and methods and thereby to foster scientific progress. This is in line with the 
norms of social epistemology and the improved articulation scenario. 
 
That the above principles have been widely accepted is manifest in a number of concrete 
attempts intended to bridge the gap between economic geographers and geographical 
economists. These include the publication of The Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Geography (Clark et al. 2000), and the launch of this journal, platforms intended to 
support cross-fertilization between the two disciplines. Yet, it is clear that the ideal 
circumstances are not yet here. On the basis of patterns of cross-references in leading 
journals for geographical economists (viz. Regional Science and Urban Economics) and 
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for economic geographers (viz. Economic Geography), Duranton and Rodríguez-Pose 
(2005) note that mutual ignorance still characterizes the relation between the two 
disciplines. 
7. Conclusions  
 
Our general conclusion is that one should not rush to pass judgement on whether a given 
academic phenomenon is an instance of economics imperialism, nor on whether to 
welcome or resist it. One should first examine the complex phenomenon using refined 
concepts that highlight its multiple aspects and variations. We have supplied a few such 
concepts that might be useful.  
Imperialism of scope in its domain-only variety is the most innocent and supportable 
form. No domain of phenomena is the sole «property» of a discipline, so attempts by 
neighbouring disciplines to explain those phenomena should not be resisted. Such 
attempts often manifest the ideal of pursuing explanatory unification by extending the 
range of phenomena explained in terms of a theory. In particular, spatial phenomena, 
using the words of Scott cited above, constitute a domain "open to appropriation by 
virtually any social science, given that space is intrinsically constitutive of all social 
science". But any claims to cross-disciplinary (imperialistic) explanatory unification must 
be constrained ontologically (those claims must be interpretable as claims about real 
unity in the world), epistemologically (the claims must be made with modesty, with 
awareness of their fallibility), and axiologically (the explanatory questions asked about 
the phenomena allegedly unified must be significant, they must satisfy some human, 
societal or cognitive values).   
It is more demanding to assess disciplinary imperialism, an attempt to reshape or even 
replace a target discipline, its convictions and conventions, theories and methods, values 
and heroes, lifestyles and identities, institutional resources and political influences. 
Imperialism of style may in principle inspire the target discipline to self-examine and 
improve its methods and standards of inquiry (as on the improved articulation scenario) – 
but it may also lead to an underestimation or even demolition of approaches and styles of 
inquiry that are valuable in meeting some important epistemic or human demands (as on 
the crowding out and re-ranking scenarios). Imperialism of standing may be based on 
misusing weakly justified images of academic prestige so as to enhance the academic or 
societal status of a discipline at the expense of that of another – or, in some (rare) cases, it 
may be a way of reallocating institutional resources and power positions in a way that 
reflects the actual epistemic capacities and performances of the disciplines involved.   
Intellectual imperialism is potentially progressive, but it may also generate scientific loss 
and regress. Because passing judgement on these matters is highly fallible, it should take 
place in circumstances that support criticism and self-criticism, tolerance and pluralism, 
mutual respect and understanding. Disciplinary boundaries are not carved in stone. 
Neither are theories and methods, nor the standards for measuring their quality. We join 
those commentators who see that the best strategy to resist the dangers of economics 
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imperialism and to exploit its potential for scientific progress lies in open communication 
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